Sustainable development en FDI: balancing home, host state and MNE responsibilities by Devisscher, Purdey
1 
 
Sustainable development and FDI: Balancing Home, Host state and MNEs responsibilities 
Work in progress – Please do not cite without the author’s permission 
 
Abstract 
The European Union (EU) has a long legacy as a proponent of human rights. Over the years its actions 
in this area have only been elaborated and the EU has taken numerous measures to address human 
rights issues, internally as well as externally. Starting from negative and positive conditionality, its 
actions were initially mainly ‘state-centred’, in line with international law. However, the wide-ranging 
challenges of globalization, such as increased FDI in developing countries, have broadened the EU’s 
focus to other more diverse areas and actors. One interesting example hereof is the case of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) and their responsibilities. Within the broader framework of 
sustainable development, the EU has attempted to strengthen corporate social responsibility (CSR), 
first mainly through soft law and slowly through hard law, not in the least by including sustainable 
development chapters in new agreements and through specific investment-related provisions. But also 
by enhancing its responsibilities as a home state, e.g. through the new Transparency and Accounting 
Directive. Such issues are particularly sensitive for developing countries, which might use, in 
particular, labour standards and environmental norms as means of exchange in the competition for 
investment. The traditional developing countries, namely the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of 
states (ACP), are a case in point. Hence, this analysis is mainly concentrated on the relations between 
the EU and the ACP countries. 
 
It is established that the EU seems to have made progress in this area, but some legal hurdles and lack 
of political will remain. In this paper, the focus will be on the legal issues and conclusions are drawn if 
indeed a balance has been found between the responsibilities and obligations regarding sustainable 
development, in particular in a trade relationship, of the host and home state, and especially the MNEs. 
 
1. Introduction 
The EU has evolved from an actor concentrated on internal European integration to a full blown 
international actor, not in the least in the traditional areas such as trade and as a partner in development 
cooperation. Globalization has confronted the EU with new challenges and required it to adapt to them 
and address them. One of these is the increased level of trade all over the world, no longer limited to 
goods or even services, but characterized by a growing demand and promotion of foreign direct 
investments (FDI1). This is also clearly reflected in the Lisbon Treaty (Article 207 TFEU). 
Globalization and, in particular, the increase of FDI, especially in developing countries, has not only 
contributed to raise awareness on human rights issues, but has also increased possible infringements 
and broadened the scope of attention beyond the traditional human rights. The risk for violations of 
labour standards and environmental norms is higher in an arena of increased competitive pressure.2 
                                                          
1
 Leaving aside the debate on the definition and scope of FDI as included in Article 207 TFEU of the Lisbon Treaty, 
Directive 361/88 (OJ 1988 L 178/5) is the most commonly used point of reference, focusing on the establishment or 
maintenance of lasting economic links. 
2
 Communication from the Commission and the European Parliament, The European Union’s role in promoting human rights 
and democratization in third countries, COM(2001)252, 08.05.2001; European Parliament resolution of 25 November 2010 
on corporate social responsibility in international trade agreements, P7_TA(2010)0466, OJ 2012 C 99 E/101; K. MANZO, 
“Africa in the rise of rights-based development”, Geoforum 34 (2003), (437) 441-442 en 451 (456); J. MACKIE and J. 
ZINKE, “When Agreement Breaks Down, What Next? The Cotonou Agreement’s Article 96 Consultation Procedure”, 
ECDPM Discussion Paper No. 64A, 2005, 1 (16); J.-M. SIROEN, Final Report: “The Use, Scope and Effectiveness of labour 
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This is reflected through the enhanced attention for sustainable development.3 Although there is a 
growing international activity4 on sustainable development thinking, there is still no international 
consensus on the precise content, meaning the specific legal commitments this entails. However, it is 
clear that labour standards and environmental norms (second and third generation human rights5) can 
be brought into this wider sustainable development framework, entailing the notion of integration of 
social, economic and environmental issues in the development process.6 The above-mentioned 
challenges appear to be of even greater importance in the realm of the EU’s relation with developing 
countries.7 It is in these countries that a legal and institutional framework is often lacking or not 
sufficient, but it is also in these countries that the fight for investments will be most fierce.8 Hence, in 
absence of a more common approach to the matter, human rights risk being used as means of 
exchange to attract foreign investors. At the same time, an answer needs to be found to address claims 
of protectionism under the umbrella of human rights violations. Within this framework lies a huge 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and Social Provisions and Sustainable Development Aspects in Bilateral and Regional Free Trade Agreements”, 18.09.2008, 
33-34 (127). 
3
 For an overview of the development of sustainable development, see: V. BARRAL, “Sustainable Development in 
International Law: Nature and Operation of an Evolutive Legal Norm”, European Journal of International Law Vol. 23 no. 2, 
2012, 379-383; H. GROSSE RUSE-KHAN, “A Real Partnership for Development? Sustainable Development? Sustainable 
Development as Treaty Objective in European Economic Partnership Agreements and Beyond”, Journal of International 
Economic Law 13 (1), 144-150 (180). The most commonly used definition of sustainable development is the definition 
included in the Brundtland report (World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), Our common future, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987, 43): “sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts: the 
concept of needs, in particular needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of 
limitations imposed by the state of technologies and social organizations on the environment’s ability to meet present and 
future needs.” It implies environmental, social and economic well-being for today and tomorrow (http://www.iisd.org/sd).  
4
 One may think of the Rio Conference on Environment and Development, the Rio+10 Summit and the Rio +20 Summit. H. 
GROSSE RUSE-KHAN, “A Real Partnership for Development? Sustainable Development? Sustainable Development as 
Treaty Objective in European Economic Partnership Agreements and Beyond”, Journal of International Economic Law 13 
(1), 144-150 (180). 
5
 This paper does not go into detail on the debate of the division between “generations” of human rights. It follows the most 
common understanding that “first generation human rights” are in general civil or political by nature, “second generation 
human rights” (socio-economic rights) relate to some social rights, such as the right to equal working conditions, the right to 
social security, the right to unemployment benefits, etc. and “third generation human rights” (collective-developmental) 
include, amongst others, environmental rights, rights to intergenerational equity and sustainability, the right to self-
determination, the right to natural resources and collective rights. 
6
 L. COTULA, Foreign investment, law and sustainable development. A handbook on agriculture and extractive industries, 
Natural Resource Issues No. 26, IIED, London, 69 (159); F. de ANDRADE CORREA, “The integration of sustainable 
development in trade agreements of the European Union” in D. KLEIMANN (ed.), EU Preferential Trade Agreements: 
Commerce, Foreign Policy and Development Aspects, European University Institute, Italy, 2013, (141) 142-143 (152). 
7
 For developing countries FDI may be a major factor for economic growth, representing a great part of the ODA, and also 
plays a major role to have access to update technology often necessary for the exploitation of their resources. However, an 
automatic correlation between FDI, growth and the improvement of labour conditions may not be assumed. O. DE 
SCHUTTER, “The Accountability of Multinationals for Human Rights Violations in European Law”, Center for Human 
Rights and Global Justice Working Paper, Number 1, 2004, 10-11 (74); M. WESCHKA, “Human Rights and Multinational 
Enterprises: How Can Multinational Enterprises Be Held Responsible for Human Rights Violations Committed Abroad”, 
Max-Planck-Insitut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (http://www.zaoerv.be) 66, 2006, (625) 626-628 
(661); A. GATTO, Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights. Obligations under EU Law and International Law, 
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011, 244. 
8
 A. GATTO, op.cit. footnote 7, 4 and 14-15 and 24-25 and 64 and 94-97. The Ramatex case exemplifies the difficult 
interrelationship between liberal trade and globalisation and human rights, especially environmental and labour law issues 
(http://www.kas.de/upload/auslandshomepages/namibia/HumanRights/ruppel1.pdf) 
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responsibility for the home state, the host state, but also for the multinational enterprises (MNEs9) 
concerned. 
The EU has always been a frontrunner in the area of human rights protection. This can be seen in 
its early pragmatic approach towards human rights violations, in absence of a sound legal basis, and 
the latter inclusion of essential elements and suspension clauses in its agreements with third countries 
as well as positive measures to ensure the respect for human rights. The same devotion can be seen in 
the area of sustainable development. Its inclusion in a firm legal framework at international level has 
appeared difficult, but this has not stopped the EU to commit and strive to achieve this internally and 
in its relations with third countries. Moreover, the remaining “state-centred” approach in international 
law might have made the road bumpier, but eventually is not a stumble block to also address the 
responsibilities of the MNEs. Being confronted with a growing level of FDI in developing countries 
and possible infringements of these ‘newer’ generation human rights, it has however become clear that 
the traditional framework and mechanism are not fit for this purpose. Hence, the EU has not only 
enhanced its existing instruments, but developed new means with attention for its own responsibility 
as a home state, those of the host state and those of the MNEs. It has not only integrated sustainable 
development as an overall objective in its new agreements with third countries, but included full 
sustainable development chapters entailing commitments in the area of labour standards and 
environmental norms and specific provisions on the behaviour of foreign investors. Continuing on the 
same path, the Union has also developed internal rules to underscore its commitment towards 
sustainable development and has endeavoured to enhance corporate social responsibility (CSR10) 
through soft law, supporting codes of conduct, and hard law, e.g. adopting transparency rules for the 
extractive industry.  
It is important that, in addressing these new challenges the overall picture is taken into 
consideration, including the legal responsibilities of all parties involved. In doing so the boundaries of 
the existing legal framework might be challenged, but to stand still is to fall back. This paper aims to 
                                                          
9
 In the context of this paper when referring to MNEs and their behaviour relating to human rights, in particular labour and 
environmental norms, this implies Multinational Enterprises domiciled in the Member States of the EU and operating in 
developing countries by extending their activities in those countries or by the creation of subsidiaries. 
10
 “CSR is essentially a concept whereby companies decide voluntarily to contribute to a better society and a cleaner 
environment. At a time when the European Union endeavors to identify its common values by adopting a Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, an increasing number of European companies recognize their social responsibility more and more 
clearly and consider it as part of their identity. This responsibility is expressed towards employees and more generally 
towards all the stakeholders affected by business and which in turn can influence its success”: COM(2001)366. Such a 
general concept was maintained in later policy documents: “CSR is an opportunity for enterprises to combine economic, 
social and environmental objectives. Greater commitment to CSR on the part of European enterprises will enhance Europe's 
capacity for sustainable development”: COM(2009)400, 24.07.2009. It is suggested to adopt following new definition of 
CRS: “The responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society. CSR entails that companies respect legal commitments, 
but also go further than their legal obligations towards society. Taking into account the international recognized principles 
and guidelines, CRS at least covers: human rights, labour and employment practices, environmental issues and combating 
bribery and corruption”: COM(2011)681, 25.10.2011. The EP had pointed out that CSR has never been clearly defined and 
now fully endorses this definition (Report on corporate social responsibility: accountable, transparent and responsible 
business behaviour and sustainable growth, A7-0017/2013, 28.01.2013). For an overview on the EU approach and 
development of CSR, first mainly domestically later in all its dimensions, see: A. VOICULESCU, “From CSR for Trade to 
CSR trough Trade: The Chronicle of European Link Foretold?”, European Foreign Affairs Review 14, 2009, 743-755 (762).  
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address the main legal issues and the role they have played in finding a balance between the 
responsibilities regarding sustainable development of the different actors in the area of trade, in 
particular FDI. This should allow formulating some thoughts on the remaining legal hurdles and 
possible suggestions for future action. 
 
2. A committed EU: general framework  
The Union is now a fully-fledged international actor, trade and development being one of the first 
areas of action. It has elaborated and strengthened this role continuously, as it appears from the 
Court’s case law and as is also reflected in the Lisbon treaty (resp. Article 207 TFEU and Article 208 
TFEU). Within the EU’s external action framework, the commitment towards the respect for human 
rights, democracy and the rule of law has obtained a firm footing. It has evolved from a case law 
developed concept of general principles11 towards a consolidation in the treaties as the very 
foundations of the EU (ex Article 6 TEU, current Article 2 TEU12) towards a transversal objective in 
the EU’s relations with third countries13 and continuously reinforced in the Court’s case law.14 The 
recognition of human rights and the democratic principles as the legal and political foundations of the 
Union, implies that they form an integral part of the EU’s external policy.15 Hence, the EU strives to 
mainstream human rights into its overall external action and promotes and attempts to export these 
values at the international scene and in its relations with third countries.16 Thus, although, contrary to 
development cooperation (ex Article 177 TEC), the respect for human rights was not included as an 
objective in the trade area, it was commonly accepted that the Union was entitled to take measures 
also in the trade field with that objective in mind.17 Meanwhile, the Lisbon treaty has not only affirmed 
                                                          
11
 Amongst others: ECJ, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, Case 11/70, ECR [1970] 1125, par. 4; Opinion of the Court of 
28 March 1996, Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Opinion 2/94, ECR [1996] 1759, paragraph 33. P. EECKHOUT, EU External Relations Law, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, 95; I. GOVAERE, “The Importance of International Developments in the case-law of 
the European Courts of Justice: Kadi and the autonomy of the EC legal order”, Research papers in law 1/2009, 10 (17); I. 
BOSSE-PLATIERE, L’article 3 du traité UE: Recherche sur une exigence de cohérence de l’action extérieure de l’Union 
européenne, Brussels, Bruylant, 2009, 425. 
12
 The current provision states: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values 
are common to the Member States in a society which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, solidarity and equality 
between women and men prevail.” Other relevant provisions are e.g. Article 7 and 49 TEU.   
13
 Council Conclusions on Human Rights and Democratization in third countries, December 2009; I. BOSSE-PLATIERE, 
op.cit. footnote 11, 173-174. 
14
 ECJ, Kadi, Case C-402/05 and C-415/05, ECR [2008] I-6351, par. 304. For an overview, see: A. ARNULL, “Left To Its 
Own Devices? Opinion 2/94 and the Protection of Fundamental Rights in the European Union?” in DASHWOOD A. en 
HILLION C. (eds.), The General Law of E.C. External Relations, London, Sweet&Maxwell, 2000, 61-64 (79); N. 
LAVRANOS, “Protecting European Law from International Law”, European Foreign Affairs Review 2010, 15, (265) 268- 
(282). 
15
 P.J. KUYPER, “Trade Sanctions, Security and Human Rights and Commercial Policy” in M. MARESCEAU (ed.), The 
European Community’s Commercial Policy after 1992: The Legal Dimension, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993, 
405. 
16
 European Consensus, OJ C 46/1 ; I. BOSSE-PLATIERE, op.cit. footnote 11, 423.  
17
 Opinion of the Court of 4 October 1979, International Agreement on Natural Rubber, Opinion 1/78, ECR [1978] 2871; 
ECJ, Commission v. Council (GSP), Case 45/86, ECR [1987] 1493. The dynamic interpretation concerning the EU’s trade 
competence and clear link with development allowed the EU to take measures to promote these principles also in the trade 
area. A. LUKASCHEK en B. WEIDEL, “Exclusive External Competence of the European Community” in S. GRILLER en 
B. WEIDEL (eds.), External Economic Relations and Foreign Policy in the European Union, Vienna, Springer, 2002, 132-
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this approach, but also enhanced it by including it as an overreaching principle guiding the EU’s 
external action and inscribing it as an obligation to do so rather than a possibility (Article 3, paragraph 
5 and 21 TEU).18 All EU external actions, including common commercial policy, need to integrate 
these broader foreign policy goals. This implies that the agreements with third countries need to 
integrate this human rights objective.  
The changing world has forced us also to look beyond the traditional human rights, and one needs 
to take in the broader concept of sustainable development. Although the objective of sustainable 
development has been inscribed into the treaties early on (ex Article 2 TEU and Article 6 TEC, current 
Article 11 TEU), the Union has further endorsed this in subsequent summits and communications 
establishing and enhancing its external dimension from the Barcelona Summit onwards.19  Similar, 
following the Lisbon Treaty its scope has been broadened and the commitments strengthened (current 
Article 3 and 21 TEU).20 Although defined in the Brundtland report (supra footnote 3), it is not 
abundantly clear what this precisely means in terms of legal principles. The clear interface between 
globalization and social development enhanced the support for social standards in economic activities 
as a specific translation of sustainable development, through the promotion of labour norms and 
support for the role of the ILO.21 The same holds for environmental standards, following the increased 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
133; K. LENAERTS en P. VAN NUFFEL, Europees recht in hoofdlijnen, Antwerpen, Maklu, 2008, 209; I. GOVAERE and 
A. VAN BOSSUYT, “Le commerce à visage de plus en plus humain? Les droits de l’homme dans la politique commercial 
commune in M. CANDELA SORIANO (ed.), Les droits de l’homme dans les politiques de l’Union européenne, Larcier, 
2006, (225) 227-228 and 237-238 (254) ; K. DE GUCHT, “Trade policy and human rights”, S&D Conference ‘Can trade 
policy improve human rights’, Brussels, 13.10.2010. 
18
 Earlier case law of the Court of Justice on development cooperation not only confirmed the respect for human rights as an 
objective of development cooperation, but even interpreted as an obligation. Advocate General La Pergola took it even 
further and made the legality of development cooperation depended upon the integration of human rights clauses. ECJ, 
Portugal v. Council, Case C-268/94, ECR [1996] 6177, par. 14-29. Opinion of Mr Advocate General La Pergola of 23 May 
1996, Portugal v. Council, Case C-268/94, ECR [1996] I-6177, par. 29; P. EECKHOUT, op. cit. footnote 11, 133-135. Other 
relevant provisions proving the EU’s strengthened commitment towards human rights are e.g. articles 6 and 2 TEU, artt. 3 
and 21 TEU and the adoption of a legally binding Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union. 
19
 Communication from the Commission, A Sustainable Europe for a Better World: A European Union Strategy for 
Sustainable Development, COM(2001)264, 15.05.2001; Göteborg European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 
15/16.07.2001; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social 
Committee and Committee of the Regions, Towards a global partnership for sustainable development, COM(2002)82, 
13.02.2002; Barcelona European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 16/16.03.2002; European Commission, Making 
globalization work for everyone. The European Union and world trade, December 2002; Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, The 2005 Review of the EU Sustainable Development Strategy: Initial Stocktaking 
and Future Orientations, COM(2005)37, 09.02.2005; Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament, On the review of the Sustainable Development Strategy. A platform for Action, COM(2005)658, 13.12.2005; 
Review of the Sustainable Development Strategy – Renewed Strategy, 10917/06, 26.06.2006; Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and Committee of the 
Regions, Mainstreaming sustainable development into EU policies: 2009 Review of the European Union Strategy for 
Sustainable Development, COM(2009)400, 24.07.2009; 2009 Review of the Sustainable Development Strategy – Presidency 
Report, 16818/2009. 
20
 Article 21 TEU entails that the EU’s external policies must pursue the objective of “fostering sustainable economic, social 
and environmental development of developing countries …”. The sustainable development aspect can also be found in 
several other specific provisions, such as ex Article 136 TEC (Article 151 TFEU), ex Article 151 TEC (Article 167 TFEU), 
ex Article 174 VEG (Article 191 TFEU). Also the inclusion in the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union of 
solidarity rights and environmental protection (Article 27-37) further strengthens this sustainable development objective. 
21
 Resolution on human rights in the world in 1997 and 1998 and European Union human rights policy, OJ 1999 C 98/270, 
points 42-47; COM(2001)416; J.-M. SIROEN, op.cit. footnote 2, 21-23 (127); J. ORBIE and L. TORTELL, “The New GSP+ 
Beneficiaries: Ticking the Box of Truly Consistent with ILO Findings?”, European Foreign Affairs Review 14, 2009, (663) 
665-668 (681). For an overview on the link between labour standards and trade within the EU, see: B. BURGOON, “The 
Distinct Politics of the European Union’s ‘Fair Trade’ Linkage to Labour Standards”, European Foreign Affairs Review 14, 
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concern for environmental consequences resulting from globalization. This resulted in the 
mainstreaming of environmental protection as another component of sustainable development.22 These 
issues are especially cumbersome in developing countries, taking into account that environmental 
degradation affects those vulnerable groups the most, as is also clearly reflected in the subsequent 
Cotonou Conventions (Article 32 Cotonou and Article 32bis Cotonouter).23 Thus, taking into account 
sustainable development relates closely to ‘newer’ rights, it can be assumed that the sustainable 
development concept manages these second and third generation human rights, such as labour 
standards and environmental norms, well.24 This is also confirmed in recital 6 of the preamble of the 
Cotonou Agreement and Article 9. Moreover, the newfound attention for the responsibilities of MNEs, 
in particular in their commercial actions abroad, through CSR, fits in perfectly with this sustainable 
development framework. 
The European Parliament (EP) fully endorses such an approach and reiterated that trade is “at the 
service” of (sustainable) development and poverty eradication, which implies that it needs to 
contribute to social progress and environmental protection, and – as was the case for traditional human 
rights – strives for the inclusion of binding social and environmental norms in trade agreements.25 The 
(practical) translation of the abovementioned goals and commitments in the relations with third 
countries, is however not as straightforward as it seems. Therein a difficult balance must be found not 
only between different interests, such as trade and human rights, but also between the responsibilities 
of the different actors involved and this must be translated into binding commitments. This is 
especially cumbersome in the relations with developing countries. Fears of protectionism, on the one 
hand, and the protection of human rights, on the other hand, need to be addressed. In relation to 
different actors involved, one must be careful to avoid claims of unlawful interference while at the 
same time one must address the issue of a poor or even absent legal frameworks and possible abuse of 
this by the MNEs operating in those countries.26 A laudable, but difficult, task awaits the Union, the 
developing countries and the MNEs.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2009, (643) 647-652 (661); F. BOSSUYT, “The Social Dimension of the New Generation of EU FTAs with Asia and Latin 
America: Ambitious Continuation for the Sake of Policy Coherence”, European Foreign Affairs Review 14, 2009, (703) 715-
716 (722). 
22
 SEC(99)777final ; Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Climate Change in 
the context of Development Cooperation, COM(2003)85, 11.03.2003; Commission Working Document, Integrating 
Environmental Considerations into other policy areas – A Stocktaking of the Cardiff process, COM(2004)394, 01.06.2004 ; I. 
BOSSE-PLATIERE, op.cit. footnote 11, 521-523. 
23
 Other measures concern e.g. the conclusion of Voluntary Partnership Agreements on Forest Law Enforcement Governance 
and Trade (FLEGT VPA). Voluntary Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of the Congo on 
forest law enforcement, governance and trade in timber and derived products to the European Union (FLEGT), OJ 2011 L 
92/127; Voluntary Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Central African Republic on forest law 
enforcement, governance and trade in timber and derived products to the European Union (FLEGT), OJ 2012 L 91/103. 
24
 I. BOSSE-PLATIERE, op.cit. footnote 11, 449. 
25
 P6_TA(2006)0242, point 59; European Parliament resolution of 18 May 2010 on the EU Policy Coherence for 
Development and the ‘Official Development Assistance plus’ concept (2009/2218(INI)), P7_TA(2010)0174, 18.05.2010, 
point 48 and 70. 
26
 Report on Corporate Social Responsibility: promoting society’s interests and a route to sustainable and inclusive recovery, 
A7-0023/2013, 29.01.2013, 25/51. 
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In this analysis the focus will be on the traditional developing countries, namely the ACP, with 
whom the Union is still striving for the conclusion of (full and comprehensive) trade agreements, 
namely the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). The Cotonou Convention27 will thus be 
included in this analysis, as well as the following EPAs: the EPA-CARIFORUM28, EPA-Pacific 
(Papua New Guinea and Fiji)29, EPA-SADC30, EPA-Ivory Coast31, EPA-Cameroon32, EPA-ESA33, 
Since the EPA-CARIFORUM is the only full and comprehensive EPA so far, the focus will be centred 
on the provisions therein. 
 
3. Putting the traditional instruments to new use? 
The integration of the objectives of development cooperation in the subsequent agreements with the 
ACP countries thereby also included the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as 
objectives of the EU-ACP relations, which is confirmed in Article 1 and 9 Cotonou.34 Taking into 
account the long standing legacy of the EU towards a human rights based approach to development, 
one wonders whether the traditional instruments are an option in addressing the new challenges of 
reuniting sustainable development, in particular respect for labour norms and environmental standards, 
and trade, especially in regard to FDI. After all, the EU has in the development of these traditional 
instruments proven to be ‘inventive’ in the past. The term traditional instruments refers to the 
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 Cotonou I, OJ 2003 L 65/27; Cotonoubis, OJ 2005 L 209/56; Cotonouter, OJ 2010 L 287/3. 
28
 Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, on the one part, and the European Community and its 
Member States, of the other part, OJ 1995 L 289/3. The agreement has been provisionally applied since December 2008 and 
was approved by the EP.  
29
 Interim Partnership Agreement between the European Community, of the one part, and the Pacific States, of the other Part, 
OJ 2009 L 272/2. It concerns Fiji and Papua New Guinea. Papua New Guinea is already applying the agreement, Fiji is not. 
30
 Interim Agreement with a view to an Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Community and its Member 
States, of the one part, and the SADC EPA States, of the other part, OJ 2009 L 319/3. It concerns Botswana, Lesotho, 
Mozambique, Namibia and Swaziland. Namibia has not signed yet and the agreement is not yet ratified. The BLNS and 
Mozambique have already let it be known that they will not provisionally apply the EPA and focus on a full and 
comprehensive EPA with the whole SADC group, even including South Africa. 
31
 Stepping stone Economic Partnership Agreement between Côte d’Ivoire, of the one part, and the European Community and 
its Member States, of the other part, OJ 2009 L 59/3. This agreement has been signed, but has not been ratified yet. Ghana 
has initialed an agreement with the EU, but it has not been signed yet. Although the EU-West-Africa negotiations have been 
closed in the meantime, they are still awaiting political endorsement. 
32
 Interim Agreement with a view to an Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Community and its Member 
States, of the one part, and the Central Africa party, of the other part, OJ 2009 L 57/2. The agreement has not been ratified 
yet. 
33
 Council Decision on the signing and provisional application of the Interim Agreement establishing a framework for an 
Economic Partnership Agreement between the Eastern and Southern Africa States, on the one part, and the European 
Community and its Member States, on the other part, 5556/09, 30.04.2009. It concerns Seychelles, Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
Mauritius, Comoros and Madagascar. So far only the Seychelles, Zimbabwe, Mauritius and Madagascar signed the EPA and 
it is provisionally applied since 14 May 2012. In January 2013 the EP approved the EPA and it is now awaiting ratification 
for official entry into force. The EPA-EAC contains similar references (Council Decision on the signature and provisional 
application of the Agreement establishing a framework for an Economic Partnership Agreement between the European 
Community and its Member States, on one part, and the East African Community Partner States, on the other part, 17462/08, 
03.04.2009). It concerns Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. This agreement has however not been signed yet 
as they are negotiating a comprehensive regional EPA. 
34
 Also in the preamble of the amended Georgetown Agreement, the attachment to the fundamental principles of human 
dignity, human rights and the rights of people was reaffirmed (ACP/27/028/92). Later on this was altered to “reaffirming 
their commitment to the respect for human rights and the rights of peoples, democratic principles and the rule of law” and the 
idea of a human centered, equitable and sustainable development was included (The Georgetown Agreement, as amended by 
Decision No.1/LXXVIII/03 of the 78th Session of the Council of Ministers, Brussels, 27 and 28 November 2003, 
ACP/27/005/00Rev.16). 
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application of conditionality35, negative as well as positive, and the broader attribution of positive 
measures, implying the mainstreaming of a development based on the protection of human rights and 
stimulating the participation of civil society. 
 
3.a. Sanctions to enhance the responsibilities towards sustainable development? 
Negative conditionality is one of the most strongly debated instruments, in particular where 
contractual relations exists between the Union and the third country concerned.36 Although an explicit 
legal basis in the Treaties to take trade measures against third countries violating human rights and a 
sound legal provision allowing the suspension of agreements with such third countries in case of such 
an infringement was absent, the EU nevertheless has found its ways to take such measures.37 Taking 
into account the precarious legal nature of such action, certainly from an international law point of 
view38, a legal consolidation was necessary. Eventually, the Treaty of Maastricht included Article 301 
and 60 TEC (current revised Article 75 and 215 TFEU) and from the early nineties on the EU started 
to develop a standard policy integrating specific human rights provisions in the agreements with third 
countries.39 To address legal problems concerning the negative conditionality in a contractual 
relationship, these clauses were considerably altered over the years. Ultimately, this resulted in the 
current essential elements and suspension clauses, including human rights and fundamental freedoms 
as essential elements, providing for a detailed procedure before taking any measures and the 
requirement to take appropriate measures in case of violation, suspension being a measure of last 
resort.40 Although the inclusion of such clauses has not passed without struggle41, the clauses 
                                                          
35
 Conditionality means a policy where a reward or attribution of advantages is allocated (positive) or withdrawn (negative) 
based on the fulfillment of certain conditions. N. TOCCI, “Comparing the EU’s Role in Neighbourhood Conflicts”, in M. 
CREMONA (ed.), Developments in EU external relations law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, 218; I. BOSSE-
PLATIERE, op.cit. footnote 11, 430. 
36
 It must be noticed that in some doctrine these essential elements clauses are considered as a form of positive conditionality: 
I. BOSSE-PLATIERE, op.cit. footnote 11, 433-439. This is probably based on the statement by the Commission 
(COM(1995)567; COM(1998)146; COM(2001)252) that the inclusion of an essential elements clause is not intended to 
signify a negative approach, but to be seen as a shared interest, a joint undertaking and to promote dialogue and positive 
measures. In sum, the essential elements and suspension clause are perceived by the EU as positive instruments, whilst the 
ACP countries consider these sanctions as a punishment. Hence, the tension. 
37
 ECJ, Racke, Case C-162/96, ECR [1998] I-3688. K. ARTS, Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: The 
Case of the Lomé Convention, Den Haag, Kluwer Law International, 2000, 167, 174-175 and 322-333; L. BARTELS, Human 
rights conditionality in the EU’s international agreements, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, 9-13; J. NWOBIKE, “The 
Application of Human Rights in African Caribbean and Pacific-European Union Development and Trade Partnership”, 
German Law Journal Vol. 06 No. 10, 2005, (1381) 1391 (1406); H. HAZELZET, “Suspension of Development Cooperation: 
An Instrument to Promote Human Rights and Democracy?”, ECDPM Discussion Paper No. 64B, 2005, 3-4 (16); F. 
HOFFMEISTER, “The Contribution of EU Practice to International Law” in Developments in EU external relations law, M. 
CREMONA (ed.), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, 94-95; P. EECKHOUT, op.cit. footnote 11, 36 and 503; I. 
GOVARE, op.cit. footnote 11, 7 (17). 
38
 P.J. KUYPER, op.cit. footnote 15, 416-417; K. ARTS, op.cit. footnote 37, 48-49; L. BARTELS, op. cit. footnote 37, 100-
106. 
39
 Council of Ministers of Development Cooperation, Resolution on human rights, democracy and development, Bull. EC 11-
1991, point 2.3.1.; Communication from the Commission, On the inclusion of respect for democratic principles and human 
rights in agreements between the Community and third countries, COM(95)216, 23.05.1995; COM(2001)252; ‘The European 
Consensus’, OJ 2006 C 46/1. 
40
 V. MILLER, “The Human Rights Clause in the EU’s External Agreements”, Research Paper House of Commons 2004, 
14; L. BARTELS, op.cit. footnote 37, 23-29. 
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contained in the Cotonou Convention appear to be the most elaborate so far (Article 9, 97 and 96).42 
Firstly, because of their scope, adding good governance as a fundamental element and inscribing a 
specific procedure in case of serious cases of corruption. Secondly, because of the detailed stipulations 
on the procedure. Not only were specific rules adopted on the decision-making within the Union to 
take such measures43, but an elaborate modus operandi before taking such measures was included. 
This was mainly a compromise towards the ACP to counterbalance claims of interference and to 
guarantee their effectiveness and the use of suspension only as a measure of last resort.44 Over the 
years the role of prior consultation and a mandatory political dialogue, as an ex ante and ex post 
solution in case of human rights violations, has grown.45 Nevertheless, and despite perpetuated calls by 
the ACP to alter this in the Cotonou revision, the final decision to take appropriate measures in case of 
violation remains an unilateral EU decision.46 This is logically also the case regarding the possible 
suspension of trade concessions attributed in the GSP. Despite subsequent alterations and stronger 
procedures, a thin line between lawful ‘interference’ and the issue of non-interference, sovereignty and 
the requirement of equal partnership, remains.47 Moreover, the absence of a coherent and transparent 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
41
 T. PARFITT, “The Decline of Eurafrica? Lomé’s Mid-Term Review”, Review of African Political Economy No. 67, 1996, 
56-57; K. ARTS, op.cit. footnote 37, 21-31 and 110, 168-189; D. CACCAMISI, “La conditionnalité politique dans les 
relations de cooperation au développement de la Communauté européenne”, Annales de Droit de Louvain Vol. 65, 2005, 
N°.3-4, (285) 296-299 (353); L. BARTELS, op.cit. footnote 37, 13; J. NWOBIKE, op.cit. footnote 37, (1381) 1384 (1406). 
42
 The preamble of Lomé III contained the first signs for a stronger legal footing for human rights in the EU-ACP relations. 
Lomé IV integrated human rights in the Convention itself (Article 5), which was also followed by a steady increase of human 
rights actions, and finally Lomé IVbis included an essential elements (Article 5) and suspension clause (Article 336bis). 
Lomé III, OJ 1986 L 86/1; Lomé IV, OJ 1991 L 229/1; Lomé IVbis, OJ 1998 L 156/1. For a historical overview see: K. 
ARTS, op.cit. footnote 3738, 167-204; P. EECKHOUT, op.cit. footnote 11, 475-476; P. VAN ELSUWEGE, “Minority 
protection in the EU: challenges ahead” in K. INGLIS and A. OTT (eds.), Constitution for Europe and an enlarging Union: 
Unity in Diversity?, Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2005, 261. 
Article 11ter Cotonoubis also includes the provision on the cooperation in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction as an essential element and the possibility to take appropriate measures (without however mentioning the 
possibility of suspension). Moreover, the provision refers to a strengthened political dialogue and the use reports by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and other 
relevant multilateral institutions (Article 11ter, paragraph 4).  
43
 OJ 1999 L 75/32; OJ 1999 L 75/30; OJ L 2003 L 65/27; OJ L 2000 L 317/376; OJ L 2008 L 129/44; OJ 2006 L 247/46. F. 
HOFFMEISTER, op.cit. footnote 37, 53. 
44
 The inscription of procedural guarantees was one of the main concerns of the ACP at the Lomé IV negotiating table, see: 
K. ARTS, op.cit. footnote 37, 188-191. But also after such guarantees were inscribed, concerns of EU unilateralism remained 
and thus needed to be strengthened, see: K. ARTS, op.cit. footnote 37, 234-240. 
45
 For an overview on how these consultations take place in practice, see: H. HAZELZET, op.cit. footnote 37, 6-7 (16). For 
an overview of recent consultations, see: L. MBANGU, “Recent Cases if Article 96 Consultations”, ECDPM Discussion 
Paper No. 64C, 2005, 17. The revised Cotonou Convention played a significant role in enhancing policy dialogue on this 
matter and in clarifying the relation between dialogue and the consultation-requirement. Article 8 Cotonoubis and Annex VII 
Cotonoubis. 
46
 ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, Draft Report on ACP-EU Political Dialogue (Article 8), PR\529176EN.doc, 
APP/3689, 06.08.2004; J. MACKIE and J. ZINKE, op.cit. footnote 2, 5 (16). Instead, Cotonouter included that such essential 
and fundamental elements shall apply equally to the ACP and the EU and its Member States (Article 9, paragraph 4). 
47
 COM(1998)146; Article 2 Lomé III; Article 2 Lomé IV; Article 2 Cotonou (revised in Article 2 Cotonouter). It is argued 
by some that the fact that such suspension possibility was included in the framework of a negotiated agreement, makes it 
harder for the third country to invoke the principles of non-interference and sovereignty, since it was included as an aspect of 
common interest (S. KEUKELEIRE, Het buitenlands beleid van de Europese Unie: de diversiteit en praktijk van het 
buitenlandsbeleid en van de communautaire methode als toetssteen voor het externe beleid van de EG. Het 
Gemeenschappelijk Buitenlands en Veiligheidsbeleid en het structureel buitenlands beleid van de EU, Deventer, Kluwer, 
1998, 124-125). However, the inclusion of such clauses is very often the result of a compromise and easier to obtain in case 
of asymmetrical relation, such as between the EU and ACP. The inclusion of this paradox, the combination of conditionality, 
on the one hand, and the principle of non-interference, on the other, is the result of a power politics and a compromise 
between the former Community and the ACP. Also the Commission, as well as the EP, seemed to put the principle of non-
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approach on the matter further supports this sense of interference.48 The use of consultation and 
dialogue to their utmost extent should counterbalance this feeling of unilateralism. In addition, the 
increased involvement of other third countries, such as China, not requiring the same respect for 
human rights, might further strain the EU-ACP relation and increase the competition between the 
ACP.49  
A second problem surrounding this mechanism, is the situation where the application should result 
into taking trade measures.50 The use of trade measures to enforce human rights remains very 
controversial. There is no legal standing on the matter and doctrine is heavily divided, but this could 
create problems of WTO-compatibility.51 It is not readily accepted, and it appears not to, that the 
human rights clause and its current application as a coercive and extraterritorial measure fits in with 
the general exception of Article XX GATT or Article XIV GATS.52 Moreover, this especially so in 
regard to sustainable development issues such as labour norms and environmental standards, since a 
link between trade and sustainable development has led to an impasse at WTO level (infra section 5).53 
Moreover, GATT jurisprudence does not seem to accept exceptions based on process and production 
method (such as working conditions), which violates the principle of non-discrimination.54 The main 
limitation is that the exceptions cannot be used to promote policy decisions in other countries in such a 
way that one starts legislating for the other.55 The fact that such action would be taken in regard to 
trade relates to concerns of the ACP that unilateral trade restrictions would be invoked for political 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
interference into perspective in the framework of respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law 
(COM(95) 567, point 33). The Council however did not follow this point of view. See:  I. BOSSE-PLATIERE, op.cit. 
footnote 11, 479-480. 
48
 K. ARTS, op.cit. footnote 37, 352-354 and 370-372; L. BARTELS, op.cit. footnote 37, 40; T. PARFITT, op.cit. footnote 
41, 56-57; V. MILLER, op.cit. footnote 40, 56-57; I. BOSSE-PLATIERE, op.cit. footnote 11, 476-484 and 488; L. 
BARTELS, Study requested by the EP’s Committee on International Trade, “The Application of Human Rights 
Conditionality in the EU’s Bilateral Trade Agreements and Other Trade Arrangements with Third Countries, November 
2008, 3 (21); H. ZIMMERMANN, “How the EU Negotiates Trade and Democracy: The Cases of China’s Accession to the 
WTO and the Doha Round”, European Foreign Affairs Review 13, 2008 (255) 271-273 (280). 
49
 D. ALLEN en M. SMITH, “Relations with the Rest of the World”, JCMS 2011, Vol. 49, (209) 212 en 220 (230). 
50
 To my knowledge, so far the application of the essential elements and suspension clause has resulted in the suspension of 
development aid rather than trade relations. S. PEERS, “EC Framework of International Relations: Co-operation, Partnership 
and Association” in DASHWOOD A. en HILLION C. (eds.), The General Law of E.C. External Relations, Londen, 
Sweet&Maxwell, 2000, 166; K. ARTS, op.cit. footnote 37, 349; L. BARTELS, “The Trade and Development Policy of the 
European Union”, EJIL 2007, Vol. 18 no. 4, 739 and 747 (756); J. NWOBIKE, op.cit. footnote 37, (1381) 1396 (1406); A. 
BRADLEY, “An ACP Perspective and Overview of Article 96 Cases”, ECDPM Discussion Paper No. 64D, 2005, 16. 
51
 G. M. ZAGEL, “WTO & Human Rights: Examining Linkages and Suggesting Convergence”, IDLO Vol. 2 No. 2, 2005, 11 
(37); B. WARDHAUGH, “GSP+ and Human Rights: Is the EU’s Approach the Right One?” Journal of International 
Economic Law 16, 2013, (827) 842-846. 
52
 B. FANSEN and M. LUGARD, “Some Considerations on Trade Barriers Erected for Non-Economic reasons and WTO 
Obligations”, Journal of International Economic Law, 1999, 530-531 and 532-536; J. L. STAMBERGER, “The Legality of 
Conditional Preferences to Developing Countries under the GATT Enabling Clause”, Chi. J. Int’L. 607, 2003, (607) 609 and 
613-614 (618); G. M. ZAGEL, op.cit. footnote 51, 11-16 (37); S. ARIEL AARONSON, “Seeping in slowly: how human 
rights concerns are penetrating the WTO”, World Trade Review 6:3, 2007, (1) 18-19 (37). For a contrasting view, see: J. M. 
KAGAN, “Making Free Trade Fair: How the WTO could incorporate labour rights and why it should”, Georgetown Journal 
of International Law Vol. 43, No. 1, 2011, (195) 209-210 (224); L. BARTELS, op.cit. footnote 48, 14-15 (21). 
53
 As a result, the only reflection of sustainable development in the WTO can be found in its preamble and Article XX GATT 
(similar Article XIV GATS), in particular Article XX (b) and (g) GATT. 
54
 G. M. ZAGEL, op.cit. footnote 51, 14-15 (37); B. WARDHAUGH, op.cit. footnote 51, (827) 842 (846). 
55
 B. FANSEN and M. LUGARD, op.cit. footnote 52, (530) 532 (536). 
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violations and for protectionist reasons.56 Nonetheless, chances that an ACP state, or any other 
developing country, would actually invoke the non-compatibility of the EU human rights clauses with 
Article XX GATT or Article XIV GATS, and lead to dispute settlement, are however small.57 What is 
even more, the majority (if not all) of the EPAs include a general exception that resembles Article XX 
GATT.58 From the wording of this general exception in the EPA-CARIFORUM, taking into 
consideration the provisions on social aspects, this also seems to apply for social issues thus rendering 
it possible to take trade restrictions for the violation of social norms. This option, however, seems to 
be constrained and might apply only for issues concerning child labour59. Moreover none of the other 
EPAs contain such reference (since they do not include specific social and environmental provisions). 
Taking this, together with the legal constraints at international level, into account it seems doubtful 
that a broader interpretation, for example allowing restrictions on goods for reasons of unfair labour 
conditions, would be applied.60 Although, considering the broader human rights and sustainable 
development objectives in this agreement, the margin for human rights considerations appears to be 
broader. Nonetheless, the use of Article 224 EPA-CARIFORUM as a coercive and extraterritorial 
measure by the EU towards the CARIFORUM for the purpose of human rights protection remains 
doubtful.  
What is even more, to my knowledge, essential elements and suspension clauses have not yet been 
used to suspend trade cooperation61 and the Commission has confirmed not to take such action. On the 
other hand, the stipulations in the EPAs seem to prove otherwise. However, also here more clarity and 
coherency was required. Even though there are no explicit, separate essential elements or suspension 
clauses62, the suggestion to include “for the avoidance of doubt the article 11, 96 and 97 of the 
Cotonou Agreement will not apply to the EPAs” 63 was turned completely. All EPAs considered here 
contain, some more explicit than others64, that Article 11 (b), 96 and 97 of the Cotonou Agreement 
                                                          
56
 The idea that an economic cooperation relationship (such as the Lomé Convention) is not the right forum for political 
discussions and considerations was also one of the main arguments for the resistance of the ACP to include a human rights 
clause in the earliest Lomé Conventions, see: K. ARTS, op.cit. footnote 37, 168-172. Other arguments were the fact that the 
EEC may not influence the choice of the social and economic system and the problem of common definitions. 
57
 S. ARIEL AARONSON, op.cit. footnote 52, 20-21 (37); L. BARTELS, op.cit. footnote 48, 15 (21). 
58
 Article 224 EPA-CARIFORUM, Article 42 EPA-Pacific, Article 90 EPA-SADC, Article 68 EPA-Ivory Coast, Article 89 
EPA-Cameroon, EPA-ESA. The general exception clause applies to trade in goods, services and establishment. It must also 
be noticed that Article 90 EPA-SADC does not, contrary to the other EPAs, refer to the protection of human, animal or plant 
life or health. 
59
 In a footnote in the agreement it is clarified that the Parties agree that, in accordance with the provisions on the social 
aspects, measures necessary to combat child labour shall be deemed to be included within the meaning of measures necessary 
to protect public morals or measures necessary for the protection of health. 
60
 Such an argument within the WTO has been repealed in the Panel Report on the Belgian Family Allowances. S. ARIEL 
AARONSON, op.cit. footnote 52, (1) 18 (37); J. L. STAMBERGER, op.cit. footnote 52, (607) 609 (618); B. FANSEN and 
M. LUGARD, op.cit. footnote 52, (530) 532 (536). 
61
 J. NWOBIKE, op.cit. footnote 37, (1381) 1397 (1406). 
62
 This aligns with the new Council policy (EU Council, Reflection Paper on Political Clauses in Agreements with Third 
Countries, Doc 7008/09, 27.02.2009). 
63
 D. LUI and S. BILAL, “Contentious issues in the interim EPAs. Potential flexibility in the negotiations”, ECDPM 
Discussion paper No. 89, 2009, 31-32 (54). 
64
 Article 73, paragraph 2 EPA-Pacific: “Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the application of all 
provisions of the Cotonou Agreement outside Title II Part 3 and according to the procedures set by the said Agreement.” 
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apply (linkage clause).65 Some of the EPAs also include a(n) (explicit) reference to Article 2 and 9 of 
the Cotonou Convention.66 However, not all EPAs explicitly refer to the possibility of the suspension 
of trade obligations67, but I tend to concur with the Commission that the Cotonou Convention is the 
framework agreement regulating the relations with the ACP and in absence of opposite provisions 
explicitly excluding this option, the essential elements and suspension clause is also applicable in 
cases were the trade relations are regulated by an EPA, even in the absence of a linkage clause.68 A 
similar provision in all EPA, full or interim, would have been better. It would have diminished the risk 
of differing interpretation and the inclusion in every clause that this also entails the application of the 
procedure set out in these articles, in the least, assures the same procedural guarantees as the Cotonou 
Convention, thus also addressing the fear for unilateralism and protectionism.69 Moreover, in view of 
the expiration of the Cotonou Convention in 2020, it might have been better to include a specific 
binding human rights clause in the separate EPAs instead of a linkage clause.70 Thus, from a legal 
point of view the option of trade measures in case of human rights violations, has not fully been 
excluded. Thought, from a more politic perspective, it is established by some that “trade related human 
rights measures” are not always effective to establish the goal of changing the policies of the third 
country concerned and rather harm the human rights situation.71 Also at UN level and within the ILO 
there is not much enthusiasm for the use of trade restrictive measures to improve the human rights 
situation.72 Hence, in trade relations such measures seem legally and practically not feasible.  
Moreover, it is not certain that such essential elements and suspension clauses also offer an option 
in case of violation of labour norms and environmental standards. Such clauses find their origin in an 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Article 103, paragraph 2 EPA-SADC: “Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as to prevent the adoption by the EC 
Party or SADC EPA State of appropriate measures pursuant to the Cotonou Agreement”. 
65
 Article 241, paragraph 2 EPA-CARIFORUM and Article 106, paragraph 2 EPA-Cameroon: “Nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed so as to prevent the adoption by the European Community or by one of the signatory Central African 
States/a signatory CARIFORUM State of any measures, including trade (related) measures (under this Agreement), deemed 
appropriate as provided for under Articles 11b, 96 and 97 of the Cotonou Agreement (and according to the procedures set by 
these articles).” A similar provision can be found in Article 80, paragraph 2 EPA-Ivory Coast.  
66
 Article 2, paragraph 1 EPA-CARIFORUM; Art 2, paragraph 1 EPA-Pacific; Article 2, paragraph 1EPA-SADC. Moreover, 
the EPA and the Cotonou Convention shall be in a complementary and mutually reinforcing manner (Article 2, paragraph 2). 
The EPA-Ivory Coast includes a more general referral in its preamble to the respect for human rights, democratic principles 
and the rule of law “which constitute the main elements of the Cotonou Agreement”, and to good governance, “which is 
fundamental to the Cotonou Agreement”. The EPA-ESA includes an even more general reference to the Cotonou Agreement.  
67
 Article 65, paragraph 1 EPA-ESA: “Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the application of measures deemed 
appropriate as provided for under the article 11 (b), 96 and 97 of the Cotonou Agreement and according to the procedures set 
by these Article.” Article 73, paragraph 2 EPA-Pacific and Article 103, paragraph 2 EPA-SADC. 
68
 Recommendation for a Council decision authorizing the Commission to negotiate Economic Partnership Agreements with 
the ACP countries and regions, SEC(2002) 351 final, 09.04.2002; K. DE GUCHT, “Trade policy and human rights”, S&D 
Conference ‘Can trade policy improve human rights’, Brussels, 13.10.2010. Only in situations where the free trade agreement 
has already entered into force and there is no guarantee that the framework agreement will also have entered into force at that 
time, a separate clause was deemed necessary. But this is not the case for the ACP. Bartels argues that the suspension of other 
agreements, not containing a linking, is even possible as he considers them to be possible “appropriate measures”. L. 
BARTELS, “Human Rights and Sustainable Development Obligations in EU Free Trade Agreements”, Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 24/2012, September 2012, 8 (19). 
69
 D. LUI and S. BILAL,op.cit. footnote 63, 31-33 (45); J. NWOBIKE, op.cit. footnote 37, (1381) 1382 (1406). 
70
 The European Parliament’s role in relation to human rights in trade and investment agreements, DG for External Policies 
of the Union, Directorate B, Policy Department, February 2014, 13 (38). 
71
 G. M. ZAGEL, op.cit. footnote 51, 5 and 24-25 (37); L. BARTELS, op.cit. footnote 48, 13-14 (21); A. GATTO, op.cit. 
footnote 7, 243. 
72
 G. M. ZAGEL, op.cit. footnote 51, 5 and 26-27 (37). 
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era of a bipolar world where the focus of the West was mainly on civil and political rights.73 It is 
nowhere defined in detail to which human rights this essential elements clause refers.74 Article 9, 
paragraph 1 and 2 Cotonou does leave the option of Article 96 Cotonou, in case of problems 
concerning labour norms, open as it clarifies that the respect for all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms also includes the respect for fundamental social rights and refers to all fundamental freedoms 
and human rights, be they civil and political, or economic social and cultural. Moreover, good 
governance includes the transparent and accountable management of human and natural resources for 
the purpose of equitable and sustainable development (Article 9, paragraph 3 Cotonou). Nonetheless, 
the subsequent separation in several policy documents between human rights, labour standards and 
environmental rules does not seem to contribute to the idea of applying this instrument also for second 
and third generation human rights.75 The absence of a sound international framework, especially 
concerning environmental norms, further supports this doubt. Regarding labour norms it is common 
understanding that these refer to the core labour standards of the ILO, namely freedom of association 
and the right to collective bargaining, the abolition of forced labour, the elimination of worst forms of 
child labour and non-discrimination in respect to employment.76 However, such a delineated reference 
is absent in regard to environmental protection. Although increasingly accepted that environmental 
degradation leads to an impairment of human rights (so-called environmental justice)77, third 
generation human rights are less commonly accepted than first and second generations and are often 
not enshrined in international legal binding documents. Hence, there is no legal certainty whether the 
application of Article 96 Cotonou is also an option in case of such a violation. Despite the 
Commissions declaration that the human rights clause also encompasses core labour standards, as set 
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 K. ARTS, op.cit. footnote 37, 21-31 and 52-53; D. CACCAMISI, op.cit. footnote 41, (285) 336-337 (353). 
74
 There is however a general referral in the preamble of Lomé III to the UN Charter, which was complemented in Lomé IV 
with a reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and by recognizing the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Council of Europe, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and 
the American Convention on Human Rights as positive regional contributions. Finally, the Cotonou Convention added the 
conclusions of the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights, the Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women, the 
International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 
other instruments of international humanitarian law, the 1954 Convention relating to the status of stateless persons, the 1951 
Geneva Convention relating the Status of Refugees and the 1967 New York Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. 
Moreover, for the first time reference was made to the respect for basic labour rights, taking into account the relevant 
conventions of the ILO. The international sources in the preamble may serve as a point of reference for interpretation, 
especially since this does not limit the EU’s point of reference to its own instruments. However, it is not clear which 
principles and rights are considered as essential elements. Moreover, they are only binding for the states that have acceded 
and ratified them. The 1998 Communication does nothing more than repeat this (COM(1998)146). In addition, there is no 
reference to ‘environmental conventions’. In comparison, over the years core labour standards have been viewed as basic or 
universal human rights.  L. BARTELS, op.cit. footnote 37, 84-85; J. M. KAGAN, op.cit. footnote 52, (195) 204-205 (224). 
75
 E.g. COM(1995)567, point 66. Nonetheless, it has been noticed that occasionally the Commission did propose to tie Lomé 
benefits to labour standards. B. BURGOON, op.cit. footnote 21, (643) 649 (661). 
76
 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, 
Promoting core labour standards and improving social governance in the context of globalization, COM(2001)416, 
18.07.2001. 
77
 O.C. RUPPEL, “Third-generation human rights and the protection of the environment in Namibia” 
(http://www.kas.de/upload/auslandshomepages/namibia/HumanRights/ruppel1.pdf).  
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out in the eight core ILO conventions78, and the general understanding is that the core labour standards 
are also basic human rights, it appears to be common practice that Article 96 Cotonou is mainly 
invoked in cases relating to first generation human rights, where one can easily rely on an international 
consensus.79 Even more, it is established that in practice the EU chiefly acts in cases of a crisis or in 
relation to an overall political situation of a third country or in cases of grave breaches.80 It must 
however be noticed that in the unilateral GSP-system, which now entails a possible withdrawal of 
concessions in case of violations of all core human and labour UN/ILO Conventions included in 
Annex VIII81, this has already been applied towards Myanmar and Belarus82. However, this is more 
difficult in a contractual relation and such a suspension mechanism is not considered to be the choice 
of preference in regard to core labour standards.83 This also appears from Article 213 EPA-
CARIFORUM that excludes the suspension of trade concession as an appropriate measure in case of 
dispute concerning the chapters on environmental and social aspects (infra section 3.b.). Although, 
this does not necessarily contribute to the idea of indivisibility and coherence, such an approach might 
be more feasible as appears from the actions taken after the Bangladesh factory collapse (infra). Also 
recent suggestion of the EP, in the framework of the second Cotonou revision, to broaden the 
principles of non-negotiable human rights and sanction mechanism have not led to an alteration.84 In 
sum, the vague nature and contested normative content of sustainable development and the strong 
opposition of the developing countries, might hamper the application of negative conditionality in 
such cases of infringement.85 The idea of the EP to include a full comprehensive human rights chapter, 
next to specific chapters on social and environmental issues (infra), might be a good idea to clarify 
some of the remaining uncertainties concerning differences in implementation and remedies.86  
Finally, this method does not appear to be adjusted in case of human rights problems in the 
framework of FDI. Although it might lead to sanctioning the host state for human rights violations 
directly linked to FDI or work preventative to discourage the host state to lower standards in an effort 
to attract FDI. As demonstrated above, in its current application the essential elements and suspension 
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clause have not been applied yet for such situations, although this option remains open.87 Also the 
argument that it may prevent European investors from violating human rights as they could lose their 
beneficial position in case of suspension does not hold.88 It is common practice that human rights 
violations do not lead to the suspension of trade cooperation. Moreover, Article 213 EPA-
CARIFORUM excludes this option in case of disputes concerning the environmental or social chapter. 
In addition, it leads to sanctioning of the host State rather than the foreign investor responsible.89 This 
also appears from the approach taken by the EU following the factory collapse in Bangladesh90, 
agreeing on a “Sustainability Compact”, but keeping Bangladesh in the EBA. However, keeping the 
option open if required reforms are too slow.91  
In sum, considering the current international legal framework on sustainable development, in 
particular environmental norms, and the existing constraints within the WTO-framework, the 
instrument of negative conditionality in trade relations, in particular in regard to FDI, does not seem fit 
to tackle violations of labour norms and environmental standards. Moreover, the EU seems to 
recognize that suspension of trade concession does not necessarily lead to the intended results. This 
makes the application of negative conditionality for the matter at least precarious, it is thus wondered 
if the use of positive measures is better fit. 
 
 3.b. A more positive approach to support sustainable development 
The EU’s support for human rights has not remained limited to negative measures and in absence of a 
legal basis for the former, the taking of positive measures was actually the only lawful action. 
Moreover, several policy documents confirm that the EU prefers a positive approach towards human 
rights.92 This is also reflected in the Lisbon Treaty, which confirms the choice for a positive approach 
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where possible (Article 21, paragraph 2 (b) TEU), by providing technical and financial assistance.93 
This approach was translated in the subsequent agreements with the ACP94 and the legislation 
regulating the successive European Development Funds (EDFs) and is easier to align with the idea of 
equal partnership and ownership as reflected in Article 57 Cotonou.95 The use of positive measures in 
a contractual relationship offers less friction with the principle of non-interference since the ACP state 
concerned needs to consent to the attribution of support.96 On the other hand, this makes the use of this 
instrument more difficult were the ACP state is less cooperative and inclined not to leave much room 
to manoeuvre for non-state actors, such as civil society or NGOs. The inclusion of such groups and the 
use of dialogue is consonant with the participatory approach of the Cotonou Convention97 and is also 
in this scenario of utmost importance. The inclusion of civil society offers room to include issues such 
as labour norms, environmental standards and CSR.98 However, actual participation varies 
considerably over the regions and practice demonstrates that financial and technical assistance was not 
mainly directed towards economic, social and cultural rights.99 Nevertheless, things seem to be 
changing.100 For example, Article 25 Cotonou aims at social development and the 10th EDF foresaw 
specific funding for sustainable management of natural resources and finances the combat against 
HIV, tuberculosis, malaria and work.101 Nonetheless, the promotion of social and environmental 
standards is not explicitly mentioned, although the EU committed to assist on legislation for adequate 
labour standards.102 The new Multi Financial Framework (MFF) committed to “take greater account of 
human rights, democracy and the rule of law” in allocating external assistance, and in line with the 
Agenda for Change identifying this as a priority, this was reflected in the individual instruments, 
particularly in the new common rules on financing external action103 and the new DCI104. Not only 
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does this entail a mainstreaming of human rights, where there is now much more emphasis on 
implementation and enforcement, there is also much more consideration for environmental protection 
and social considerations as well as corporate responsibilities.105 Examples are, the obligation to 
conduct environmental screenings106, the thematic program “Global public goods and challenges” of 
the DCI107 and, in line with the new public procurement directive, the obligation for natural and legal 
persons who have been awarded contracts to comply with applicable environmental legislation 
(including environmental agreements as well as internationally agreed core labour standards)108. 
Although Article 19c Annex IV Cotonou implies the same in the 11the EDF, this could have been 
more explicit.109 Even though the 11th EDF110 falls outside the general EU budget, translating the 
Agenda for Change in practice, it also aligns with the human rights priority111. And in conformity with 
increased attention for climate change and environmental protection in Cotonouter also includes more 
environmental considerations112, but any explicit reference to CSR, environmental norms and labour 
standards seems to be absent. 
This broad framework of positive measures entails the instrument of positive conditionality, 
making the attribution of development aid and (mid-term) review dependent upon needs and 
performance criteria.113 The respect for human rights was however not explicitly enshrined in these 
needs and performance criteria, but was generally included in the drawing of the Country Strategy 
Paper and Indicative Program.114 The broad meaning of needs and performances and the 
abovementioned provisions clearly allowed for an evaluation taking into account the human rights 
situation, but it might have been advisable to explicitly include this as a criterion. This was altered in 
the new MFF, but again only implicitly addressed  in the 11th EDF. The MFF called for allocation 
criteria to be more objective and dependent on the efforts and progress concerning human rights, 
democracy, the rule of law and good governance115. In line with the Agenda for Change, the DCI 
includes needs, capacities, commitments and performance and potential impact in the respective 
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country as allocation criteria, explicitly including good governance and human rights to fall under the 
performance criterion.116 Although Article 3 Annex IV Cotonouter and the 11th EDF, aligning with the 
DCI, includes the same allocation criteria there is no specification on the interpretation of these 
criteria.117 Taken the Agenda for Change into account this would, logically, also entail human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law.118 Unfortunately, neither in the DCI nor in the 11th EDF, is there a 
clarification whether this also entails environmental standards and labour norms119, including CSR, but 
the provision of Article 3, paragraph 7120 and paragraph 8121 DCI as well as Article 2, paragraph 4 EDF 
certainly offer room for such considerations. It remains to be seen what the actual allocation 
methodology of the 11th EDF will look like, depending also on the weight given to each criterion. 
Although respect for human rights is of major importance, a political criterion cannot be predominant 
and following the Agenda for Change, more weight should be attached to the needs criterion and a 
clarification on their interpretation, also including and monitoring CSR. Nonetheless, as is exemplified 
by the GSP+122, it is extremely difficult for developing countries to comply with social and 
environmental requirements and it places an additional requirement on the ACP countries, hence the 
importance not only helping those already on track as well as the need for capacity building, which 
was clearly reflected in the next DCI and proposals for the 11th EDF in line with the Cotonou 
Convention. 
The use of positive incentives in a trade framework is exemplified by the GSP-system, especially 
the GSP+. On the other hand, the granting of EBA preferences is not made dependent on the respect 
for human rights. The same holds for the EPAs. Neither the conclusion of such agreements nor the 
attribution of trade flexibilities within the framework of those agreements have been made dependent 
upon the respect for human rights, including labour norms and environmental standards.123 The 
reluctance to do so also appears from Article 213 EPA-CARIFORUM. Moreover, such a 
conditionality might create problems of WTO-compatibility124, has proven to be ineffective in the 
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GSP+ framework125, and adding such a condition to the conclusion of an EPA would make the already 
cumbersome negotiations even more difficult. Moreover, such an ex ante conditionality is also not 
inscribed into the general Cotonou Convention126 and would not be consonant with the general policy 
of the EU preferring to maintain a link with the country concerned rather than isolating it.127 Also here, 
the aid incentives seem to be the preferred alternative route (e.g. Article 190 and 196 EPA-
CARIFORUM).  
In sum, compared to negative conditionality and in absence of a solid legal framework, the use of 
positive measures trough financial and technical cooperation is especially important to promote a 
solidarity based community and more fit for situations that require an active involvement of the 
government where resources are often lacking.128 The application of positive incentives within a trade 
relationship are however less straightforward.  
 
Overall, the use of the traditional instruments has evolved and offers some room in the area of trade 
and for the protection of second and third generation human rights. But, in their current legal format 
these do not seem the most feasible option from a practical and legal point of view to address the 
issues of sustainable development in a trade relation. The EU has acknowledged that the sustainable 
development dimension of globalisation requires a different set of measures and attempted to develop 
mechanisms that are more fit for purpose also taking into consideration the growing responsibilities of 
other actors involved. 
 
4. Committing to sustainable development: finding a balance? 
International attempts to connect sustainable development and trade in the WTO-framework have 
failed.129 Similarly, the attempts to include a reference to labour standards and environmental 
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protection within the Multilateral Agreement on Investment have not succeeded.130 The main idea is 
that other international organisations are more fit to address sustainable development issues, including 
CSR131. There is no agreement on the matter whether there is room for considerations based on the 
violation of non-WTO norms132 and no legal stance on the extraterritorial application of the general 
exceptions (supra section 3.a.). The resistance of developing countries in fear of protectionist 
measures under the umbrella of human rights violations, further endorsed this.133 A suspicion that also 
finds a reflection in the Cotonou Convention and EPAs (infra). Despite the limited inclusion within 
the WTO framework134 and reticence in other international for a, taking the Treaty provisions into 
account (supra section 2) the EU should pursue sustainable development in its contractual relations 
beyond its commercial interests, integrating social, economic and environmental aspects. Maybe 
exactly because of this impasse, the integration of sustainable development provisions in bilateral and 
regional trade agreements has increased over the years. The Union continues to strive for a sustainable 
and fair social-economic development in its relations with third countries135  and has attempted to 
enhance the legal value of its commitment on sustainable development through the inclusion in its 
agreements with third countries.136 This through the inclusion of sustainable development as an overall 
objective. In line with this policy, the Cotonou Convention entails such an explicit and broad 
sustainable development objective in Articles 1 and 9 and reiterated in Article 19 Cotonou.137 Also the 
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EPAs include in some way or another the sustainable development concept, but as is the case for the 
essential elements and suspension clause, more alignment between the different EPAs would have 
been advisable. The EPA-CARIFORUM is the strongest case in point. Therein sustainable 
development was not only included as an overall objective138, it was further clarified that this 
commitment, hence a legal binding obligation, implied that in the application of the agreement full 
account shall be taken of human, cultural, economic, social, health and environmental best interests of 
their respective population and future generations and that the decision-making methods shall embrace 
the fundamental principles of ownership, participation and dialogue.139 The EPA-SADC and EPA-
Pacific contain more general provisions. And again,  the EPA-Cameroon and EPA-ESA are less 
elaborate and include sustainable development in their general objectives140, while the EPA with Ivory 
Coast only contains a general reference to sustainable development in its preamble.141 For these ACP, 
the sustainable development issue was left to further negotiations in the perspective to conclude a full 
and comprehensive EPA.142 The abovementioned future negotiations on the matter probably refer to 
the elaboration in specific social and environmental provisions. It is somewhat strange that the EPA-
SADC and EPA-Pacific, contain no such reference in their rendez-vous clause.143 Here again, since the 
Cotonou Convention ‘frames’ the EU-ACP relations, the sustainable development objective works as 
an umbrella and also needs to be applied in the EU-ACP trade relations even in absence of a specific 
referral in the EPAs concerned. This is supported by the fact that the Commission departs from the 
assumption that developing countries may only enjoy the benefits of trade if sustainable development 
is protected and promoted.144 In absence of an international legal framework, the exact content and 
more specifically the legal obligations this might entail has not yet been clarified.145 The overall 
contention is that, just as policy coherence for development, this objective should be construed as an 
obligation of conduct rather than results.146 This has the advantage that it leaves room for policy space, 
but needless to say that it makes the legal enforceability of this objective very difficult.147 
Nevertheless, it has an important interpretative value and since it is included as an overall objective all 
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provisions need to be read, implemented and all decisions need to be taken with that objective in 
mind.148 This implies, contrary to international investment law, that sustainable development also 
plays a substantive interpretative role for the FDI provisions.149 The Union, with the EP as one of the 
main human rights proponents, attempted to further enhance the level of protection and its obligations 
by including specific environmental and social chapters as well as specific provisions on the behaviour 
of foreign investors. 
 
 4.a. Translating responsibilities into legal commitments 
In line with the general EU’s policy and increased leverage of the EP in trade agreements after the 
Lisbon Treaty rooting for such an inclusion, this has been further fleshed out in a specific social and 
environmental clauses in the Cotonou Convention and chapters in the EPA-CARIFORUM.150 These 
specific social and environmental clauses clearly reflect the difficult balance between the need to 
protect these norms and fears of protectionism (resp. Article 49 and 50 Cotonou).151 These provisions 
appear however very general. The idea was that these provisions would form the basis for further 
negotiations and would be more elaborate in the EPAs. Taking into account the EPA-CARIFORUM is 
the only full and comprehensive EPA to date, it is also the only one containing specific social (Article 
191-196) and environmental (Article 183-190) chapters.152 In both cases the provisions contain some 
general stipulations to promote trade in goods and services beneficial for the environment and fair and 
ethical trade (Article 183, paragraph 5 and Article 191, paragraph 5), the importance of these issues at 
regional level (Article 185 and 194) and cooperation (190 and 196). Article 183 and Article 191 could 
have included a more explicit reference regarding CSR, as was done in the trade agreement with South 
Korea and Central America.153 It appears from the following provisions that human rights cannot be 
sacrificed for the sake of free trade. Although certainly noteworthy, the special environmental and 
social chapters do not seem to include more than some general commitments, mainly repeating what 
was already contained under the Cotonou Convention and reiterating obligations to which the parties 
have already committed themselves to (Article 183 and 191).154 Hence, establishing a minimum set of 
obligations. However, of great importance minimizing the competition between countries for FDI, is 
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the inclusion that the Parties agreed (shall ensure) not to encourage trade or FDI by lowering their 
level of protection provided by environmental and social or labour legislation or derogating from or 
failing to apply legislation (Article 188 and 193).155 How this will be enforced is another matter and it 
offers little guarantees if not all EPAs include such a commitment, they risk undermining the overall 
objective and human rights will be played out in the competition for trade (so called “race to the 
bottom”156). Moreover, it should have included that this also entails that the parties shall not fail to 
enforce such legislation, as was done in the Colombia/Peru Agreement157. In general, one can wonder 
why no firmer and more detailed commitments were included as was done in that agreement and the 
GSP+158. They do not only reaffirm the commitments already made, but also e.g. commit to an 
effective implementation in its laws and practice and the GSP+ strongly relies on cooperation with the 
relevant monitoring bodies, in particular the ILO.159   
As mentioned before, concerning the labour standards a clear delimitation is made referring to the 
core labour standards of the ILO (Article 191).160 Probably for political reasons and due to time 
constraint, leaving such matters to further negotiations for full and comprehensive EPAs, but there 
appears to be no legal impediments to include such a reference also in the other EPAs since most of 
the signing ACP countries are also ILO member.161 Moreover, compared to what is the case in the 
social clause, in regard to the environment the reference remains very general (Article 49 and in 
Article 183, paragraph 3 EPA-CARIFORUM). It is wondered why, since the GSP+ and the agreement 
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with Colombia and Peru162  do contain a specific list of international environmental agreements, this 
was not done in the EPA.163 On the other hand, the referral to multilateral and regional agreements and 
environmental agreements to which they are parties (Article 184 and 72) should prevent the EU falling 
back on its own interpretation, which would have enhanced the idea of protectionism.164  
Conversely, the agreement includes provisions meant to ensure that this would not be used for 
protectionist purpose also guaranteeing the choice of policy. Prima facie the stipulations on guarantees 
against protectionism appear to be very vague.165 They entail respect for the parties to determine their 
own policies and a reference to take to the special needs and requirements and their own social and 
sustainable development priorities into consideration (Article 184, 185 and 192). It can be wondered 
why the transparency requirement (Article 187) in the environmental chapter and the specific 
reference not to use these labour norms for protectionist purposes  (Article 191, paragraph 4) were 
respectively not included in the social chapter and in the environmental chapter. Essentially it is 
Articles 213 and 224 EPA-CARIFORUM (infra) are the guarantees against use for protectionist 
purposes. A lot will depend on the actual compliance in practise and application of the specific control 
mechanism and dispute settlement when required.166 The EPA-CARIFORUM contains a fairly broad 
monitoring mechanism, namely the Consultative Committee and CARIFORUM-EC Trade and 
Development Committee with a broad mandate regarding sustainable development issues.167 Article 
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184, paragraph 3 provides for possible exceptions for example based on the protection of human, 
animal and plant life or health, this was not included in the social chapter. Hence, the general 
exception of Article 224 applies. As noted earlier, it is however not yet clear how or even if this can be 
applied for social or environmental issues (supra). In case of a dispute surrounding these specific 
chapters additional requirements were installed, next to the general provisions on dispute settlement 
(Article 204 et seq), providing for a more elaborate system of consultation and advice resulting in a 
report of a committee of experts (Article 189 and 195). It is only when this fails the general dispute 
settlement provisions apply and even then specifications are included, namely on the establishment of 
the arbitration panel in case mediation fails (Article 207, paragraph 4 and 221, paragraph 3) and 
possible appropriate measures in case of non-compliance (Article 213). As mentioned before, Article 
213 EPA-CARIFORM entails that the suspension of trade concessions are not considered being 
appropriate measures in case of problems on the environmental or social chapter. While this is a step 
away from the sanctions based approach and seems to avoid claims of protectionism168, it might 
undermine the idea of indivisibility of human rights169 and does not coincidence with the application in 
the GSP170. Yet, recent actions, such as towards Bangladesh (supra), seem to root for a different 
approach.  It remains to be clarified in future dispute settlement how article 213 and 224 will be 
interpreted, taking sustainable development as an overall objective into account171. 
Reflecting the difficulties surrounding the concept of sustainable development and taking the 
remaining deficits into account, in the realm of the current (international) framework, the provisions in 
the EPA-CARIFORUM were a good compromise between the inclusion of a separate social and 
environmental conditionality clause and fear for its use as a protectionist measure.172 
 
 4.b. Adapting to the new challenge of FDI in developing countries 
The EU has taken efforts to address the responsibilities of the MNEs. Considering the new 
characteristics of international trade, foreign investors can and should have a major role to play in the 
protection of human rights, in particular labour and environmental norms, especially when operating 
in developing countries (infra section 4).173 It is in those countries the adoption and enforceability of 
legislation for that cause is difficult.174 It is therefore the EU’s task to ensure “that trade agreements 
not only contribute to the establishment of legitimate rights of European enterprises, but also their 
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duties in the field of environment, labour and human rights in general”.175 After acknowledging the 
limitation the existing CSR framework entailed (infra), and in line with the intention for a new 
common investment policy176 and the general policy on development cooperation, the EPAs are 
considered to offer great potential to make the trade, development and CSR link operational.177 The 
EPA-CARIFORUM is indeed innovative, establishing for the first time a direct link between human 
rights and FDI. This was done through the inclusion of specific provision on the behaviour of 
investors, the maintance of standards and a general exception clause that also applies for FDI.178 This 
in an attempt not only to guarantee respect for such rights but also avoiding that investors play off 
different countries against one another.179 Unfortunately, Articles 72-73 EPA-CARIFORUM do little 
more than repeating what Articles 183-196, previously analysed, already included such as the non-
lowering of standards to encourage FDI, and contain little additional obligations and are again directed 
towards the host state.180 Although certainly noteworthy, the clause on the maintenance of standards 
(Article 73), entailing a legally binding obligation181, could have included that this implies that 
national legislation should be established clarifying that private contracts may not include clauses 
exempting the foreign investor from the application of new social and environmental laws nor include 
a requirement for the host country to compensate costs for compliance with such laws.182 This would 
at the same time clarify possible discussion in investor-to-state disputes, if this would be included in 
future EPA (infra). Moreover, future EPAs, provided that they include pre- and post-establishment 
FDI-provisions, might inscribe that investments made will only be protected if the investment is while 
made respecting national legislation (on environmental protection and labour laws). Combined with an 
increasing level of national legislation and support trough financial and technical cooperation, this 
offers great potential to create more binding obligations. The provisions on the behaviour of investors 
(Article 72) 183 goes beyond an intention to endeavour or merely best efforts by entailing an actual 
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obligation (shall), but is still less stringent than those formulated in relation to the traditional human 
rights. This clause does not create legally binding obligations for MNEs and although the inscription 
of direct obligations for investors might be difficult in respect of public international law, the 
provisions could be stronger and certainly enhanced in the future. A suggested by the EP this could 
include the idea of Socially Responsible Investment (SRI)184, referring to the UNCTAD Investment 
Policy Framework for Sustainable Development (2012) and inserting a stronger CRS clause in future 
agreements. An obligation could have been included for the home and the host state to encourage 
enterprises to respect existing international codes. This would no longer make them voluntary for the 
MNEs and ensure that blatant infringement carry consequences, on the one hand, and, on the other 
hand, offer sufficient flexibility for the host state.185 At least the current provisions could have further 
been specified, for example by clarifying that this includes appropriate access to a tribunal for the 
enforcement of the States’ environmental or labour law and ensuring access to alternative non-judicial 
remedies for example by recalling the options the International Chamber of Commerce offers or other 
complaints mechanisms.186 A stronger CSR clause, in future agreements, should entail more than the 
core labour standards, including for example also employment conditions, incorporate reporting and 
monitoring mechanisms and complaints or other kind of accountability mechanism.187 However, up 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Latvia and Romania) as well as South Africa the first an obligation already flows from the OECD Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transaction. It is also one of the few Convention that contains 
an obligation for the State Parties to exercise jurisdiction in respect of bribery offences committed abroad by their nationals 
(Article 2 and 4 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention). Moreover, this commitment on the part of the EU has been further 
strengthened by the recent initiative on transparency rules for extractive companies (supra).Also the African Union 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption attempts to address this issue, requiring the state to enact legislation 
that criminalises the bribing of government officials. But there remain lacuna also in this area, for example not addressing 
non-cash gifts or actual enforcement. O. DE SCHUTTER, op.cit. footnote 7, 7 (74); 
http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm, accessed 27 March 2013; L. COTULA, op.cit. footnote 6, 
110 (159). 
184
 This implies combining the investor’s financial objectives with their concerns regarding social, environmental, ethical and 
corporate governance issues (Report on corporate social responsibility: accountable, transparent and responsible business 
behaviour and sustainable growth, A7-0017/2013, 28.01.2013, point 20). 
185
 E. VAN DER ZEE, “Incorporating the OECD Guidelines in International Investment Agreements: Turning a Soft Law 
Obligation into Hard Law?”, Legal Issues of Economic Integration 40, No. 1, 2013, (33) 32, 51 and 52- (72) (and 6). This 
would imply for example the set up of National Contact Points to promote and implement the OECD Guidelines and the 
inclusion for investors to conduct human rights impact assessments. It would enhance the possible enforcement of the 
Guidelines. Other suggestions were the establishment of a Joint Committee or an Ombudsman. 
186
 D. AUGENSTEIN, “Study of the Legal Framework on Human Rights and the Environment Applicable to European 
Enterprises Operating Outside the European Union”, Submitted by the University of Edinburgh 
(http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/files/business-human-
rights/101025_ec_study_final_report_en.pdf, accessed 05.04.2013), 46-47 (81); L. COTULA, op.cit. footnote 6, 27 (159). 
187
 The EP further suggests a system of transnational legal cooperation to bet set up between the EU and third countries 
signatories of trade agreements to ensure effective access to justice. It however went further and called for an international 
judicial procedure to ensure that breaches of the law by companies are punished. For suggestions on a future CSR clause, see: 
P7_TA(2010)0466, OJ 2012 C 99 E/101, point 26-27; A7-0023/2013, point 91; Report on promoting development trough 
responsible business practices, including the role of extractive industries in developing countries, A7-0132/2014, 19.02.2014; 
Report on Advancing Development Through Trade, A7-0057/2013, 04.04.2013, point 31; Opinion of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs on Corporate Social Responsibility: accountable, transparent and responsible business behavior and 
sustainable growth, 05.12.2012, points 8 and 21; The European Parliament’s role in relation to human rights in trade and 
investment agreements, DG for External Policies of the Union, Directorate B, Policy Department, February 2014, 17-18 (38). 
28 
 
until now suggestions to include such clauses were not followed up nor were explicit reference to 
these codes included (infra).188  
In addition, the provisions regulating the access and establishment of FDI (Article 67-70) seem 
more lenient than the behavioural requirements and limit the policy space of the CARIFORM states. 
As appears from Annex IV, only some of the CARIFORUM States have considered the ramifications 
of the undertaken commitments. It will be of utmost importance that other ACP countries do the same 
in the negotiations of full and comprehensive EPAs. Moreover, compared to traditional bilateral 
investment treaties, the general exception clause of Article 224 also applies for FDI.189 This might 
offer a leeway for the host state, in this case the CARIFORUM countries, to pursue a public policy 
conducive to sustainable development (ensuring the right balance between the protection of the 
investor and the need for state intervention), provided such measures are necessary and 
proportionate.190 However, it is not entirely clear yet how this exception clause will be applied in 
relation to sustainable development, in particular labour norms and environmental standards, and in 
relation to the Article 67-70 EPA-CARIFORUM (supra).191 A more explicit referral in the general 
exception clause to the human rights obligations, or even sustainable development, might alleviate 
this. 
Compared to more traditional political settlement of disputes, the provisions in the EPA-
CARIFORUM provide for a more “judicilized” mechanisms. However, without there being a 
differentiation between dispute settlement for trade and investment. Consequently providing only for 
state-to-state dispute settlement and limiting the accessibility for private individuals.192 Moreover, the 
composition of an arbitration panel including also persons with specific expertise on environmental 
and social matters, appears not to be guaranteed here. It would be advisable to clarify this. In general 
and in compliance with Article 219 EPA-CARIFORUM, there should be a balance in investment and 
human rights expertise, ensuring room for human rights considerations which is currently lacking in 
most Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). The practical implications for human rights considerations 
in FDI-rulings remains to be seen.193 If future EPAs would include provisions on investor-to-state 
disputes, Article 224 EPA-CARIFORUM should be clarified decreasing the risk of investors suing 
                                                          
188
 However, also suggestions to include more CSR into the GSP, have also not been followed. P7_TA(2010)0466, OJ 2012 
C 99 E/101, point 20. The intention was to include a binding requirement for states to ensure that cooperations fulfill 
obligations in the areas of human rights, labour standards and environmental rules. Other suggestions are for example the 
inclusion of contractual clauses in all “finance for trade and development” offered to the private sector, requiring compliance 
with the OECD Guidelines and UN Guiding Principles and adding an accountability and complaints mechanism (point 36 
and 89, 42/51). 
189
 A. DIMOPOULOS, op.cit. footnote 89; D. AUGENSTEIN, op.cit. footnote 186, 46-47 (81). 
190
 For considerations concerning the possible use of exceptions by the ACP to trade liberalizations based on the protection of 
their rights, the choice of policy and interests, see: See fort his argument: J. NWOBIKE, op.cit. footnote 37, (1381) 1401-
1404 (1406). 
191
 A7-0023/2013, 44/51. 
192
 A. DIMOPOULOS, op.cit. footnote 87, (565) 572-576 (594). 
193
 A. DIMOPOULOS, op.cit. footnote 87, (565) 590-594. 
29 
 
governments for reducing their profits in legislating for the protection of the environment or social 
concerns.194 
Although innovative and the fact that the provisions creates restrictions for FDI to the advantage 
of human rights considerations, one need to remain careful that MNEs are not only bestowed with 
rights. Rights come with responsibilities and this should be further enhanced (in future EPAs). One of 
the main lacuna, also here, is the question of accountability and enforcement. There is no mechanism 
to include civil society and the persons who are directly affected do not have a guarantee of an 
enforcement mechanism, this depends on the legislation of the host state.195 The only option provided 
is the application of Article 97 Cotonou, which is again state-centred. Although the initial inception 
that this provision only relates to corruption situations in regard to development aid has now been 
broadened, it has rarely been used and it can be wondered if it would actually be invoked and applied 
in relation to Article 72 EPA-CARIFORUM.196 Up until now, it can be doubted whether a sufficient 
balance is indeed struck between the protection of the investor and the need for state intervention.197 
This might partly be alleviated by the EU in the fulfilment of its responsibilities as a home state (infra 
section 4).  
 
5. MNEs rights and responsibilities? 
The growing level of activity of enterprises in third countries, in particular developing countries, 
requires to divide the attention between the host state responsibilities and those MNEs more evenly. 
Although the latter indeed cannot take over public authorities’ responsibilities in issuing suitable 
legislation, including access to remedies, MNEs have acquired a significant role with connection to 
sustainable development and trade.198 One can no longer argue that the only social responsibility of 
business is to increase profits.199 Although there has been reluctance in the past to address the issue of 
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MNEs’ behaviour, this is no longer attainable as is demonstrated by public opinion and increased legal 
writings on the matter.200 Changed consumer behaviour has resulted in MNEs adopting a more 
proactive role, taking voluntary initiatives and committing to general or sectorial codes of conduct.201 
These initiatives were followed up at international level.202 One of the biggest initiatives of MNEs at 
international level is the UN Global Compact203 and the UN Norms, meant to complete the UN Global 
Compact, which were however never adopted by the UN Human Rights Commission.204 After the set 
back of the UN Norms, a UN Framework on Business and Human Rights was adopted205, for which 
the EU expressed its full support. The adoption of the ‘Guiding Principles for Human Rights’  serves 
as an “authorative global reference point for business and human rights”206. Also the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises as revised in 2000207, which were established exactly as a 
counterweight to the extensive protection granted to the rights of investor in most investment 
agreements, are worth mentioning as one of the first guidelines adopted by governments and addressed 
to MNEs, but are not directly binding on the MNEs.208 Also the ILO Tripartite Declaration on 
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Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, creates recommendations but is not legally binding.209 
One of the main stumbling blocks remains the ‘state-centred’ approach of international law resulting 
in the absence of a general consensus on direct obligations and legal accountability of legal persons.210 
Other deficiencies of the current framework are the fact that these remain voluntary, prove to be little 
transparent, lack sufficient implementation following problems of monitoring, reporting, verification 
and enforcement or accountability mechanism.211 The fragmented approach through different codes 
and systems makes effective control on the actual implementation very difficult and too often results 
in situations where such codes are mainly used for public relations’ purposes, but not actually 
changing behaviour.212 Recently, the United Nations Forum on Sustainability Standards (UNFSS) was 
launched.213 Hopefully, some of these issues are addresses there. 
 
 5.a. The EU’s first efforts to address MNEs responsibilities 
In the face of the current absence of an international recognized direct accountability for MNEs for 
human rights violations, respect for human rights predominantly induces obligations for the host State, 
respecting the principles of participation and ownership, as well as for the home State.214 However, 
focus has mainly been on the host state, resulting in the Union laying down obligations for developing 
countries. In relation to FDI, however lies another substantive responsibility for the Union, namely as 
the home state. The Union has been one of the main proponents to address the issue of the MNEs 
responsibilities, establishing the idea of CSR and making the business world a partner for development 
in the long run.215 However, just as is the case for sustainable development, CSR has never been 
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clearly defined, hence also here the room for different interpretation and difficulties on the objectives 
and the agreement on the legal responsibilities this entails. The EP has formulated the responsibilities 
of the EU as follows: “the Union must ensure that the external policies it implements make a genuine 
contribution to the sustainable development (…) and that the actions of European corporations, 
wherever they invest and operate, are in accordance with European values and internationally agreed 
norms”.216 Following suit and finding its origins in the EP’s calls for a code of conduct for enterprises 
operating in Southern Africa during the apartheid217, the EP has continued to strive for a binding EU 
Code of Conduct rejecting the argument that such a code would not legally be possible nor called 
for.218 However, this has not yet resulted in a binding instrument at EU-level either.219 Nevertheless, 
the EU has explored different roads to commit to its responsibilities as a home state and strengthen 
their obligations.220 Instead of aiming at a EU-wide code of conduct, the Union chooses to promote 
CSR in all areas of its competence using the abovementioned international codes as a point of 
reference221 and supporting and promoting MNEs to abide by these codes, rather than subscribing to 
many different sectorial codes.222 However, the Commission has realized, following the EP’s 
endeavour to move beyond a voluntary CSR-approach223 and more common standards224, that soft law 
has its limits.225  
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The Union has attempted to find answers to enhance and raise awareness on MNEs responsibilities 
from within, but with extraterritorial implications trough e.g. adjustment of the public procurement 
rules226, the fair and ethical trade initiatives, sustainability labelling schemes227, promotion of other 
trade-related private sustainability initiatives228 and the promotion of incentive mechanisms.229 It is 
unfortunate that for such incentive mechanisms there remain huge differences between the Member 
States in the application of such incentive mechanisms remain and only a few take human rights 
directly into account.230 Moreover, reflections of such incentive mechanisms to promote CSR in 
agreements with third countries remain vague.231 Also fair and ethical initiatives find there reflection 
in the agreements (e.g. Article 184 and 191 EPA-CARIFORUM), but do not necessarily make them 
stronger from a legal point of view.  
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 5.b. Legal accountability for MNEs? 
Still, to avoid double standards and strengthen the EU’s responsibility as a home state, a more 
mandatory system providing binding uniform standards and rules on accountability for all EU 
enterprises operating abroad, especially in developing countries, is called for. Taking into account the 
current boundaries in international law (on extraterritorial application of legislation and jurisdiction), 
the absence of a general obligation for a home state to control their nationals (natural and legal) 
abroad232 and the limitations to assimilate such conduct with that of the State itself233, one can wonder 
on the basis or feasibility for the Union to adopt such measures. The absence of such an obligation 
however does not hinder the possible adoption of European legislation in that regard. Moreover, there 
is a responsibility for the EU and its Member State, taking the Treaty into account (Article 3 and 21 
TEU and Article 208 TFEU), towards developing countries to ensure that their enterprises do not 
violate human rights operating in those countries. This was duly recalled by the EP.234 This would also 
align with the obligation of international cooperation, which is being revitalized in international 
human rights law, and the idea of international solidarity. This would not contravene with State 
sovereignty and to avoid any claims, the EP’s idea to include developing countries in the process 
should be taken on.235 
One if the first options that comes to mind is the use of the Brussels I(bis)-Regulation236 for civil 
liability.237 Not only does the Regulation appear to offer an option to establish a national jurisdiction 
on civil liability resulting from human rights violations in third countries inflicted by EU-based238 
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companies239, following the Court’s case law240 it also seems to exclude the option to shift 
responsibilities to the host country via the forum non conveniens. The new lis pendens rule risked 
providing an escape route for some MNEs (Article 33 and 34 Brussels Ibis), with a forum non 
conveniens creeping in silently, but there is no obligation for the court of the Member State to stay its 
proceedings (it may), so offering a way out and guaranteeing an access to justice.241 It is a shame the 
proposal to include a forum necessitates nor the other proposal to extend possible establishment of 
jurisdiction in cases where the defendant is domiciled in a third State, were followed.242 This could 
have provided options in situations where the non-EU subsidiary is the defendant, where now this is 
left in the hands of the national private international law rules.243 Nevertheless, Brussels I(bis) offers 
many roads to guarantee an access to justice. However, an actual access to remedies needs to be 
assured as well. To avoid the risk of a legal framework falling short, as is often the case in developing 
countries, by applying the principal rule of lex loci damni, the public policy of the forum can offer a 
solution.244 Moreover, for environmental damages the lex loci acti might apply if the victim chooses 
so.245 In addition, taking into account the Member States obligations as members of the EU and the 
European Convention of Human Rights as well the fact that the application of the lex loci delicti in 
case of a decision of a parent company based in the EU could also lead to the application of their 
Member States’ legislation, possible hurdles in regard to MNEs accountability (also in terms of access 
to remedies, fair trail, etc.) can be addressed. Indeed there is room for improvement, for example by 
enlarging the scope of the exception in cases of environmental damages also for other human rights 
violations, but in sum, there is a good case for civil accountability of MNE domiciled in the EU, 
following the violation of human rights in developing countries, without the necessity even for 
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legislative changes.246 It might however even be feasible to harmonize the type and level of civil or 
administrative sanctions.247 Nevertheless and despite the recognition of these instruments to better 
ensure effective access to remedies248, neither the Commission nor the Council refers to this option 
and one can question the actual application of the Brussels I(bis) and Rome II Regulations in this 
area.249 Up until now, also international calls to clarify on the issue of extraterritoriality for violations 
by companies, this call has remained without response.250 The issue of criminal liability for legal 
persons, at EU level251, for conduct abroad is even more sensitive.252 The Belgian example on 
extraterritorial criminal liability253, with even amendments – following the disappointments within the 
WTO on the social dimension – to include violations of core labour standards254, seems to imply that 
there is support for such measures.255 However, the fierce reaction in regard to its actual application 
and the amendments of the legislation also demonstrate the cautious approach on the matter256 and 
there remain huge differences between the Member States. The advantages of an EU initiative thus are 
manifold, it would lead to a faster adoption on legislation on corporate conduct, would resolve 
possible problems of distortion of the competition, decrease the impact of business lobby and lessen 
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possible criticism that such legislation is taken for protectionist purposes. Moreover, since the Lisbon 
Treaty (Article 3 TEU and Article 82 and 83 TFEU) there is a firmer legal basis for EU legislation on 
jurisdiction and the approximation of substantive criminal law.257 Nonetheless, history proves this to 
be very difficult. Up until today legislative measures have been directed towards very specific offences 
and include no general obligation for the Member States to establish criminal sanctions, which is still 
the case also after the amendments in the Transparency Directive (infra).258  Although a more common 
and coherent approach would send an important signal to the international community, reality is that 
there appears to be no willingness. Thus from within the EU is hampered to take measures to enhance 
legal accountability of MNEs.259  
Nonetheless, the loopholes the absence of a fully-fledged ex post accountability leaves can be 
addressed by establishing a sound legal framework on ex ante accountability and that is what the 
Union has attempted to do through the amendment of the Accounting and Transparency Directives.260 
These rules require large undertakings, public-interest entities and issuers who securities are admitted 
to trading on a regulated market active in the extractive industry, namely oil, gas and mining firms and 
loggers of primary forests to be transparent on payments made to governments above 100.000 €.261 
The focus on these sectors is prompted by the possible negative consequences of the so-called 
“recourse curse”262 and the fact that these activities are most vulnerable to human rights abuses and 
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corruption.263 Attempts to broaden the application also to other sectors, such as the banking, 
communication and construction sector, were blocked.264 Disclosure of payments, in money or in 
kinds, should be done on a government and project base. The application of sanctions, in case of 
infringement is left to the Member States, but administrative sanctions and penalties should be 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive (resp. Article 51). Moreover, the Transparency Directive 
provides for a list of minimum sanctions that can be applied and are clearly also directed towards legal 
entities (Article 28 et seq.). Additionally, a list of criteria was included to take into account in the 
exercise of the sanctioning powers. The Transparency Directive, besides including a specific chapter 
on sanctions and measures, also includes a chapter on the publication of decisions requiring the 
Member States, in principle, to provide for the publication of every decision on sanctions and 
measures including at least information on the type and nature of the breach and identification of the 
legal or natural person. The adoption of such measures is an important preventive measure and leads 
to a greater preceding accountability of MNEs and may also contribute to good governance.265 
Although the major flaws were altered in the final versions, such as the scrapping of the criminal 
exemptions266, the same considerations remain, such as great differences between Member States and 
no general obligation for criminal sanctions267. The inclusion of undertakings also in other sectors 
operating in third countries was preferred and a lot will depend on its monitoring and enforcement 
providing for effective, proportional and dissuasive penalties in case of omission.268 Such legislation is 
again a step towards illicit financial flows resulting from corruption or bribery, but again sanctions 
towards the host countries are provided for (Article 97 Cotonou) whilst equally dissuasive sanctions 
for the MNEs are not guaranteed. Moreover, the idea was to be able to trace the money and ensure its 
use to fund local and national development and to attain the MDGs, however it will be difficult to 
actually track the spending of the money.269 This would align with the obligation of Article 9 
Cotonou270 entailing a revenue management based on sharing for sustainable development.271  
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Besides the specific rules on payments for governments, the Accounting Directive also inscribes 
the inclusion of non-financial key performance indicators, being an essential element of CSR, such as 
information relating to environmental and employee matters (Article 19) and a corporate governance 
statement in the management report (Article 20). However, these provisions remain fairly general. One 
needs to be careful that this does not lapse into a general standardized referral to the international 
codes they subscribe to, without actually altering its conduct, and without sufficient enforcement 
mechanisms (supra). It remains to be seen whether any remaining lacuna on MNEs responsibilities is 
sufficiently addressed resulting from the approval of the Commission proposal regarding legislation on 
non-financial reporting272, but it appears to include similar minimum requirements and a lot of 
flexibility for the companies. The proposed amendments by the EP seem to strengthen this approach, 
e.g. by including an explicit referral to CSR, providing attention also to the supply and subcontracting 
chains, offering detailed guidelines on the information such a non-financial statement should include 
as well as the requirement that Member States should indeed ensure effective means to enforce 
compliance.273 
 
As the CRS extends to the behaviour of MNEs towards and in third countries it should thus also be a 
core part of the EU’s trade and development policy and included in its contractual relations.274 
Unfortunately, the current mechanisms, voluntary and legislative, can be greatly appreciated. It is a 
shame that the renewed EU strategy (2011-2014) for CSR seems, despite calls for more emphasis on 
the external dimension of CSR275,  limited and low in ambition on this front.276 Similar to traditional 
human rights, dialogue, consultation and the involvement of the host state, civil society and other 
relevant organization, is crucial. However, following the 4th EU-Africa Summit, CSR and the need for 
greater transparency on finance was only mentioned in the side-lines and is nowhere to be found in the 
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Roadmap.277 In the current approach (see also supra section 4), the EU wanted intention to intensify 
the commitment to the voluntary international codes of conduct by including them in the agreements 
with third countries.278 However, none of the EPAs even include a reference to the OECD Guidelines 
or UN Global Compact or Guiding Principles and also the explicit inclusion of CSR is very 
moderate.279 It is suggested that, if a more binding CSR clause or code of conduct would be included, 
this might trigger problems relating to Article 2 TBT Agreement and possible trade-restrictive effects 
will probably need to be addressed. However, this relies on the assumption that a CSR code of conduct 
is considered as a technical regulation, which is controversial.280 Secondly, as noted before, one of the 
most innovative mechanisms is the inclusion of provisions on the behaviour of investors and 
maintenance of standards in Articles 72-73 EPA-CARIFORUM. Nonetheless, a greater equilibrium 
between the rights and duties can be reached, by strengthening current commitments and addressing 
questions of monitoring and enforcement. Laudable as they are, there is thus certainly room for 
improvement (supra section 3.b.). 
 
6. Conclusion 
The initial question on how to reunite commitments on sustainable development with the increased 
number of FDI, in particular in developing countries, and the responsibilities of all parties involved 
has confronted us with three major issues and numerous points of controversy. There remains a lacuna 
at international level in the area of legal commitments towards sustainable development. A 
comprehensive set of environmental norms is not readily accepted, this is less problematic regarding 
the core labour standards, but for both there is still much controversy on the connection between such 
norms and trade. Moreover, this appears to be even more difficult in regard to FDI which also entails 
an important role for MNEs. Also here, an international consensus on possible direct accountability for 
MNEs remains absent, especially through extraterritorial jurisdiction and the extraterritorial 
application of legislation. In all areas the Union has been a frontrunner and attempted through internal 
legislation and in its contractual relationship with the ACP to address these issues aiming not only at 
the responsibilities of the host state, but also taking its own responsibility and enhancing those of the 
MNEs. It appears that this path is more capable of reconciling different interests, namely liberalization 
and human rights, and taking on legal commitments. This is however not to say that it is perfect, but it 
is a first step in the right direction since it provides more than the current international framework 
                                                          
277
 Fourth EU-Africa Summit, Declaration, 2-3 April 2014, point 35. 
278
 COM(2002)347. 
279
 The reference to CSR is even more modest in the EPA-CARIFORUM (article 196, paragraph 2 (d)) than in the FTA with 
Colombia and Peru (article 270) and the one with South Korea (chapter 13). 
280
 VIDAL-LEÒN has argued that even if confined to private measures, based on the interpretation of Article 3 TBT, this 
might lead to problems relating to Article 2 TBT. It is recognized that some CSR schemes, if qualified as technical 
regulations, might induce trade-restrictive effects and trigger problems relating to Article 2 TBT Agreement. It may however 
be doubted whether the conditions for CSR to be qualified as a technical regulation, namely applying to an identifiable 
product or group of products, laying down one or more product characteristics or PPM and mandatory, are fulfilled. Besides 
this, there is indeed a need for active engagement of the WTO in other international organizations in the establishment of 
CSR disciplines. See: C. VIDAL-LEÒN, op.cit. footnote 129, (893) 901–916 (920).  
41 
 
offers on sustainable development as well as most existing investment treaties. As future EPAs might 
also include post-establishment FDI-provisions, also in that area human rights considerations will 
assume their role.  
The traditional conditionality method was a significant first step for a human rights based approach 
to development and despite suggestions to widen its scope for example by referring to the UN Norms 
or CSR, it does not appear to be the most appropriate mechanism in a trade context nor in relation to 
sustainable development issues.281 Moreover, there seems to be a lack of coherence in its application 
in and between the EPAs. The newly developed mechanisms, including sustainable development as a 
general objective and further elaborated trough specific environmental and labour provisions and 
investor behaviours’ provisions, are in dying need for further clarification on their content, the 
application of possible exceptions and claims in case of violation. The lack of clarity on the trade – 
sustainable development connection also seems to have crept into the agreements with the ACP. It 
remains to be seen whether a balanced outcome can be found, in case of disputes, between economic, 
social and environmental considerations. Moreover, the current commitments need to be strengthened 
into stronger legal obligations, with actual implementation commitments, accountability, monitoring 
and enforcement mechanisms. Without detracting on the merits of such new provisions, the current 
EPA-provisions are a first stepping stone and can be used to improve future EPAs, in the meantime 
they are more likely to function as guiding norms rather than actual obligations. In addition, although 
the Union also as a home state of many MNEs has stepped up its efforts on the issue of accountability 
of MNEs, offering a better mix of soft law and hard law, questions on actual accountability and 
enforcement remain, while the options are there. 
 
There is a persisting need for more international unity, which would probably also lessen possible 
trade disruptive effects, however this does not appear to materialize in the near future.282 One of the 
major challenges is thus the inclusion of such provisions in all future EPAs, ensuring a level playing 
field between the EPAs and the support for the establishment for a more common legal framework 
binding for all ACP to ensure obligations, implementation, monitoring and enforceability in line with 
the idea that “the basic principles of unity and solidarity need to be reconciled with the new demands 
of global cooperation”283. This would decrease the risk of human rights being tossed for the sake of 
FDI. The use of dialogue and the inclusion of civil society could further set off claims of unilateralism 
and protectionism. Still the majority of responsibilities lies with the host state and whilst the EU has 
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also addressed its responsibilities as a home state, the existing legal possibilities especially in regard to 
the accountability of MNEs, needs to be used to its utmost extent.  The Union has succeeded to move 
beyond purely economic matters and numerous noteworthy initiatives have been taken, but the EU 
seems to linger on soft law and hampered by political will. Although there are signs in the right 
direction284, still an important task awaits the EU, as well as the ACP as united group, to steer towards 
more international consensus, cooperation between the relevant international organizations and 
assurances for a better balance between the rights and duties of states and investors. 
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